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1  Background
The rapid flow of information across societies has now become the norm, and a conse-
quence of this is evident in the remarkable transformation across a variety of institu-
tional forms. Consider two interesting and relatively recent cases: open science and free 
culture. The former enables mass participation in scientific endeavors, and the latter 
advocates the free distribution of all forms of creative content over the internet.1 Neither 
is the change in institutional forms limited only to narrow scientific or cultural endeav-
ors. Even in the broad context of economic reform, Rodrik (2008) suggests the idea of 
‘second-best’ institutions, proffering two notable arguments. First, that a variety of insti-
tutional forms, observed in different contexts, achieve similar objectives, and that this 
puts into question any presumption of a unique set of institutional blueprints. Second, 
that the objectives of an institution vary by the context of their environment. For exam-
ple, in the early stages of development, the encouragement of entrepreneurial activity 
relies on a more strident protection of rent, and the timing of import liberalization after 
export liberalization eases the burden of trade liberalization policies generally. However,  
1 While examples abound, merely as glowing exemplars for each category one might consider Galaxy Zoo for open sci-
ence, and Creative Commons for free culture.
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while institutional change is neither new nor novel, our contention is that the informa-
tion era brings with it an existential challenge to traditional institutional forms.
The motivation for this paper is our belief, shared by many researchers in the field, 
that there is more merit in an approach that examines the effectiveness of institutions by 
acknowledging how, in practice, they are characterized by complex structures and social 
interdependencies rather than assuming such complexities away. We argue that broadly 
three categories of institutions must be distinguished: economic, political and social. 
However, we aver that they must then be looked at simultaneously as three related 
dynamical systems to underscore their interdependencies. Doing so concentrates focus 
on the processes of institutions rather than on their traditional labels. Since we wish to 
suggest a methodical manner of achieving this, we propose a theory of smart institu-
tions; we adapt the framework of control process engineering that is well suited to deal 
with complex and integrated dynamical systems in developing this approach.
Smart institutions differ from traditional or generic institutions in three essential and 
distinct aspects: their context sensitivity, their forward-looking perspective and the foun-
dational role of information and feedback in their operation. The aspect of contextual 
sensitivity in smart institutions derives from a unified consideration of social, politi-
cal and economic factors. While specific smart institutions may favor such factors to 
varying degrees, their setup is expressly based upon an eclectic consideration of effects 
across the societies they operate within. Smart institutions are also progressive in their 
operation; this is a key distinction since it makes them less susceptible to the institu-
tional inertia that routinely characterizes (and plagues) generic institutions. Finally, 
smart institutions emphasize information flows and the consideration of the value of 
subjective social feedback in order to inform their operations.
In our view, the crucial role of information and feedback in the analysis of institutions 
cannot be overstressed, especially if our ambition is to have smart institutions as the 
basis for a modern society.2 Smart institutions are based on the systematic incorporation 
of information in their operation; indeed, this is an integral part of the setup we propose. 
Contrast open science or online education initiatives to the traditional institutions that 
have historically curated those practices; one of the key points of difference in our view 
is that smart institutions are much better at dealing with larger and more varied sources 
of information.
Our theory for smart institutions spans the social sciences and emphasizes a dynamic 
and circular flow of information; in a system of smart institutions, the steering institu-
tions interact with their environment to effect economic, social and political change; the 
impact of such changes creates feedback that recursively affects the behavior and the 
overall design of the system. This emphasizes the central role of information and social 
feedback in our theory.
We inform our theory on smart institutions with the methodology of modern control 
process engineering expressly because of its ability to handle complexity and to adapt to 
varying contexts. In Sect. 2, we outline the logic of how a control engineering process 
operates and examine how this translates to a social process. Given the novelty of this 
2 We owe the conviction of our thinking on this issue to the idea of the ‘adaptive efficiency’ of the institutional matrix in 
a society as presented in North (2010).
Page 3 of 23Goorha and Mohan  Economic Structures  (2016) 5:15 
approach, we develop much of the intuition using simple economic, social and politi-
cal examples, which serve as our counterpart to a simple control engineering process 
like a thermostat used to regulate temperature in a room. However, it is worth empha-
sizing at the outset that the same control engineering paradigm that governs the work-
ings of a thermostat can be used to handle a far more complex system like an airplane. 
Likewise, our theory for smart institutions presented in this paper is capable of analyz-
ing models based on complex or general social, economic and political interactions as 
well as more specific or simpler versions. In Sect. 3, we investigate each element of our 
approach introduced in Sect. 2 in greater depth while underscoring, in the process, link-
ages to well established theories in the social sciences. This section also examines the 
nature of social feedback and the role of information in smart institutions. In Sect. 4, we 
incorporate PID tuning (a basic control process engineering methodology) to examine 
how smart institutions impact social processes based on social feedback. We offer some 
concluding comments in Sect. 5.
2  A control‑theoretic framework for building smart institutions 
In this section, we lay the groundwork for what we mean by smart institutions using the 
perspective of control theory, where the emphasis remains squarely on the dynamic 
functioning of an entire system based upon the role of contextually relevant information 
in guiding institutional control. Naturally, a certain degree of latitude is needed in apply-
ing this setup to the social scientific study of institutions, where overriding and precise 
laws (such as those we find in physics) are absent.3 With that caveat, we begin by intro-
ducing the terminology for such an evaluation.
 Smart institutions can be considered to operate in a closed control loop, as depicted in 
Fig. 1. While elaborating on each component, we will find it useful to draw the parallels 
between institutional analysis and control process theory in engineering applications as 
depicted in Fig. 2. 
Much like a heating system, comprised of a furnace and a thermostat, that exists to 
influence the temperature of its surroundings, we can think of a society as a system that 
seeks to influence an output, y. When we are concerned about how this system oper-
ates dynamically, we can equally consider an output, yt, that is produced at some time t. 
Depending on the context (i.e., social, political or economic), y may be interpreted differ-
ently. Broadly, it may be understood to measure the modernization of a country, which 
is clearly a multidimensional growth process. It may instead, depending on the context, 
be also interpreted as the economic development of a society. If the focus of attention is 
a single institution like a regulatory body governing environmental issues, we may wish 
to interpret the output as the air quality index. No matter what the context, however, the 
output is something the level of which can be controlled, at least to some degree, by the 
system.
The operation of a system (whether an engineering system or a society) and its abil-
ity to produce a desired output relies on the interaction of a controller and a plant, 
which comprises an actuator and a mechanism. In the context of smart institutions, the 
3 While the use of Control Process Engineering in the social sciences is extremely rare, see Goorha (2009) for an applica-
tion linking the political and economic development dynamics.
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controller is a complex or set of economic, social and political institutions, which we 
call the steering institutions. The steering institutions seek to control the behavior of the 
social process, or plant, which produces the output. The steering institutions generate a 
set of reference variables (wt) that can be interpreted broadly as the objectives over a set 
of variables that the social, economic and political steering institutions interactively and 
collectively define for society. In congruence with control theory, we envisage the man-
agement of smart institutions to involve feedback, and we imagine this feedback to be 
drawn from members of the society that the steering institutions represent.
In order to influence the behavior of the social process (plant), the steering institutions 
(controller) produce ‘low-powered’ actuating signals (ut) based on the specific mecha-
nisms of control that the institutions oversee, and their levels depend on the behavior 
of the output in contrast with the reference variables; in other words, the actuating sig-
nals are, in some sense, a function of the reference variables. While the precision with 
which actuating signals are produced in practice may vary, it is this tractable and direct 
dependence of actuating signals upon reference variables and feedback that is at the 
foundation of what makes smart institutions ‘smart.’
In control engineering systems, actuators transform the low-powered actuating signal 
into a higher-powered signal sent to the mechanism that is able to produce the output. 
For smart institutions, based on the actuating signals that are received from the steer-
ing bodies, the social, political and economic actuators, within the plant then generate 
higher-powered signals (st) sent to their respective development mechanisms that, along 
Fig. 1 Components of a smart institutions system
Fig. 2 Control process in engineering
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with random disturbances (dt) affecting the system, determine yt. Thus, a political insti-
tution may actuate the sternness of its regulatory body which then uses its higher power 
of intervention in the market to modulate an outcome or a social religious institution 
may actuate the religiosity of its many adherents to enable a mobilization effort in effect-
ing an outcome. Therefore, it is the efficacy of the allied actuators in transforming low-
powered institutional signals into a high-powered effort that imparts significance to any 
given institution within the wider complex of institutions.
In an engineering process, a low-powered signal is one that consumes little energy in 
its production and transmission. The social science counterpart of this is the generation 
of a low-cost or low-effort signal. The actuating signals are low powered in this sense; 
examples would include an interest rate announcement by a central bank, a manifesto 
issued by a political party to which its members must adhere, an opinion expressed by 
the head of a religious organization, and so on. In all these instances, the signals have 
low costs to generate and, implicitly, low cost to implement as well. The central bank 
implements its interest rate policy through open market operations, the political party 
may enforce its manifesto on its members through the threat of expulsion, and the reli-
gious head may rely on the consequences implied by a religious text to ensure compli-
ance. In contrast, the signals sent by actuators to the mechanism are high powered in the 
sense that they involve a high cost or effort for their generation and implementation. A 
bank, for example, must assess the impact of the change in interest rates imposed by the 
central bank and re-optimize its own strategy to maximize its profits, which will involve 
changes to its borrowing and lending activities that then permeate through the economy. 
Similarly, the manifesto of a political party must be communicated to voters by members 
of the party through effort in the form of political meetings, media appearances, distri-
bution of flyers, door-to-door canvassing, etc. The views of the head of a religion must 
be absorbed and communicated by religious figures such as priests through sermons. In 
all these cases—banks, political party members, priests—the efforts for generating and 
implementing their signals are relatively high compared to actuating signals.
Indeed, the low-powered actuating signals are incapable of generating an output on 
their own and rely on the galvanizing force of high-powered signals produced by actua-
tors to achieve this. This allows us to concretize the meaning of effectiveness of a social, 
economic or political institution and to distinguish between weak and strong institu-
tions. We investigate this further in Sect. 3.3. The impact of the output on the reference 
variables is then assessed by members of the society, and once this information is pro-
cessed, it is transmitted to the steering institutions and considered by them. Thus, there 
exists the idea of feedback, or metering, which is an evaluation process that produces a 
set of feedback variables (zt). It is worth noting that this characterization of zt as an eval-
uation is broad enough to incorporate not only hard data and statistics, but also social 
commentary and opinion. We imagine feedback in its most general form and allow it 
to encompass any information that can influence the design of the reference variables. 
Depending on how the subjective performance of the system, as expressed by zt, com-
pares with the reference variables (wt), the steering institutions design the reference vari-
ables for the next period (wt+1), and the process repeats itself.
The feedback process in the social science context is far more complex than feedback 
in an engineering system, and this carries implications for the operation of a system of 
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smart institutions. Nevertheless, it is in the degree of tractability and open verifiability of 
this process that we see the key distinction between what constitutes a smart institution 
as opposed to any generic institution.
While we elaborate on this further in Sect. 3.5 below, at this stage consider a simple 
example that captures the elements involved: an environment protection agency as a 
smart institution. The agency might raise the price of carbon credits to control pollution. 
In any economy, especially in the presence of internal and external shocks, the impact of 
this policy on unemployment may be less than certain. In particular, if unemployment 
does rise appreciably, the consequences of an economic downturn may move into the 
social sphere through, say, higher crime rates. If the downturn persists, the government 
may be held responsible, and the impact is felt politically as well. As opposed to a generic 
institution, where such feedback from society is ordinarily a second-order consideration, 
for a smart institution the relevant steering bodies would directly consider their feed-
back sources, be they academics, the media and the average voter. A number of issues 
arise here, and while they may not be novel, the manner in which the feedback informs 
the operation of the institutions is crucial to a theory of smart institutions. First, the 
feedback process may generate useful new information, or it may generate information 
that is already expected by the steering institutions. In Sect. 3.5, we discuss the concept 
of entropy that enables us to measure the value of feedback for the steering institutions, 
but a key point of difference between generic and smart institutions is worth noting 
here. While a generic institution may also solicit and consider feedback, its relevance to 
the functions of the institution is not critical. For smart institutions, on the other hand, 
the value of the information to the process of their operation is paramount.
Second, it may be impossible to segregate feedback as being entirely relevant for a sin-
gle steering institution. For example, voters who remove an incumbent government from 
power may be unhappy not only with the government’s handling of unemployment, but 
also with rising crime in society. Feedback may, therefore, be fuzzy in the sense that 
it may be relevant for economic, social or political institutions to varying degrees. As 
opposed to generic institutions, smart institutions would not discard as irrelevant infor-
mation that does not directly inhere to the scope of their remit.
Third, smart institutions are capable of incorporating fuzzy or qualitative feedback and 
quantifying it for their steering institutions. In Sect. 3.5, we discuss the implications of 
fuzzy feedback.
Embedded in the theory of smart institutions based upon a control process is the idea 
that their relevant steering institutions function as automatic controllers do in control 
process theory, where the term automatic refers to the fact that they initiate action based 
on discrepancies perceived between the desired outcome and the actual outcome of the 
system. More specifically, their role is not only to provide the reference variables, but 
also to then use their individual steering mechanisms, which are different for differ-
ent institutions, to devise the values for their actuating signals given knowledge on the 
behavior of the plant, the levels of the disturbances over time and, crucially, the control 
error between the reference variables and the actual outcome. This is the idea of ‘auto-
matic control,’ and with advances in modern control theory, where controllers may be 
built using fuzzy logic, the parallels with the less precise field of institutional analysis are 
starker and more useful still.
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We can now see how the various elements in our model for smart institutions integrate 
for a single iteration of the entire system. Consider the simple example of a presidential 
system, like the USA maintains, as a smart institution with the office of the president 
serves as a steering institution. Suppose the set of reference variables comprise a vector 
of elements, where each element pertains to a specific department of the government, 
with the cabinet secretaries functioning as actuators. To implement these objectives, the 
president’s office generates actuating signals, or directives, that are sent to each cabinet 
secretary. The actuators (secretaries) take these low-powered signals and generate high-
powered ones that are capable of influencing the output. The bureaucracy within each 
department functions as the main mechanism of the plant where this high-powered sig-
nal is converted into an output. For instance, the Department of Education may be sent 
a directive based on an executive reference variable on average examination scores to be 
achieved by public schools; the Department for the Environment may be sent a directive 
based on a reference variable for a certain amount of reduction in carbon emissions; the 
Treasury may be sent a directive based on a reference variable for the fiscal deficit and 
so on. Indeed, each department may be sent a multiple of directives based on a single or 
more than one reference variables.
A similar transformation is achieved by the vector of high-powered signals between 
the matrices of directives and functions within the plant that correspond to influencing 
them. The bureaucracy within the Department of Education, for example, may have to 
decide how to allocate scarce public funds among the various public schools, determine 
the incentives provided to teachers and set minimum standards for the adoption of new 
technology into classrooms—all this with the goal of achieving the directive(s) given to 
their department, depending on the reference targets set by the executive. As the agents 
in the plant, the bureaucracy in our example, respond to these high-powered signals, the 
output over the course of time will be realized. At a very elementary level, the output 
may have achieved the targets set out in the reference variables. Or, due to a number 
of factors the output may be far away from the targets intended by the steering institu-
tion. These factors could include the degree of bounded rationality of the steering insti-
tution in setting the references, the inability of translating reference variables into clear 
or acceptable directives, the capabilities of the bureaucracy, the inherent uncertainty in 
the environment and so on
Once the output is produced, its impact is assessed by members of the society. For 
instance, it may transpire that the fiscal deficit incurred by the treasury is deemed too 
inflationary. Or it may eventuate that the move toward a reduction in carbon emissions 
is considered to be too aggressive by a majority of the society, and held responsible for 
a recessionary pressure on the economy. Or the emphasis toward average school leav-
ing scores is viewed as stifling creativity among children. Or, even if the original refer-
ence variables are viewed favorably, the bureaucracy may have been inefficient and fail 
to implement schemes that are successful. All these effects will be gauged by members 
of the society, and the information transmitted to, and absorbed by, the steering institu-
tions. This feedback, along with the actual realization of the output, may influence the 
reference variables selected by the steering institutions in the next period; for exam-
ple, the targets on carbon reduction and fiscal deficit may be revised, and less emphasis 
placed on school leaving scores. The manner in which the steering institutions respond 
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to social feedback is, of course, context based; for example, we can imagine that a gov-
ernment formed through a dictatorship is (typically) less responsive to social feedback 
than one formed through a democratic process.
This example, while simplified for the sake of illustration, highlights the dynamics of 
how a system of smart institutions might operate, and the crucial importance of their 
steering institutions in setting the reference variables and in determining how these ref-
erence variables respond to social feedback. As the process unfolds, steering institutions 
may learn not only how to modify the reference variables, but also the efficacy of the 
signal generation process. Institutional analysis becomes specifically important in this 
control-theoretic conceptualization of smart institutions for the precise purpose that it 
answers the question of how information is processed to generate values for a large set 
of actuating signals that, in turn, help make the output of the overall system respond to 
the reference variables. This focus provided to the analysis of real-world institutions is 
especially useful for the tractability it imparts.
3  A discussion of the components of smart institutions
The use of control theory provides a useful general approach for studying the overall 
functioning of smart institutions, for it is amenable to being developed in as elaborate 
or complex a manner as is desired, just as it is possible to use it to simplify institutional 
analysis. For instance, in engineering applications, an engineered plant can be as simple 
as a thermostat or as complicated as the autopilot system onboard an advanced fighter 
jet. Similarly, depending on the context under analysis, we could consider an array of 
steering institutions, multidimensional signals, complex forms of output and sophisti-
cated methods of feedback in the construction of a model of smart institutions. On the 
other hand, using the same control-theoretic structure described in Sect.  2, we could 
focus on a single steering body within a smart institution and a scalar output with simple 
mechanisms for generating signals and feedback.
Section 2 identifies the main elements of smart institutions: steering institutions that 
generate low-powered signals, actuators that transform these to high-powered ones, 
output that is produced by the actions of the steering institutions and actuators within 
a social process, and a social feedback mechanism that influences the steering institu-
tions’ choice over reference variables. In this section, we explore each of these elements 
in depth.
3.1  The steering institutions
The seminal contributions of Williamson, North and Ostrom have served to mitigate 
opposition in the mainstream economics literature to the idea that institutions matter 
to economic development and that, more generally, they are a significant component in 
our understanding of how societies develop. Even when examined alongside other fac-
tors in comparative analyses institutions seem to have a predominant effect. Rodrik et al. 
(2004), for instance, emphasize the primacy of institutions among the factors that influ-
ence the relative affluence of societies.
Given that institutions do seem to matter to the development of societies in general, 
and an economy in particular, it is surprising that institutional analysis in economics 
often manages to underplay their relevance. We propose two reasons for this negligence, 
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both of which are made explicit in our theory on smart institutions. The first is the ques-
tion on whether there is some order, chronological or hierarchical, in which different 
types of institutions exert their influence. The second is our contention that, in exam-
ining particular outcomes, where institutional analyses focus on the institutions them-
selves, they will be likely to miss the indirect effects of the control they exert.
While there has been some debate surrounding this issue, the general assessment 
seems to be that the order in which institutions manifest their influence can affect the 
path that development takes. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2005) suggest that the suc-
cess of European economic performances on the back of Atlantic trade can be explained 
by a sequence of changes, where political institutions took a leading role in respond-
ing to the incipient prospects of beneficial trade by developing better mechanisms for 
the establishment and protection of property rights, which facilitated the subsequent 
innovation and developments in economic institutions. Williamson (2000) goes a step 
further in suggesting four levels for the order of change among all forms of institutions 
in operation in a society. The first level corresponds to what we perceive as social institu-
tions in our set up—institutions that are predominantly characterized by informal rules, 
norms and religion. The order of change here is very slow, and Williamson suggests that 
change is minimally over a century. The second level corresponds to the characteristics 
held by political institutions in our model or institutions that determine and enforce the 
formal rules of the game such as the judiciary and the polity. Here the order of change 
is typically as little as a decade to as much as a century. The third level comprises what 
we have in mind as economic institutions, and typically contains those institutions that 
actually assist in ‘playing of the game’ and contracting. The order of change here is as lit-
tle as a year to as much as a decade. The final level is that of interaction within the mar-
ket, where change is continuous.
Our view is that a focus on the order in which institutions exert their influence or any 
hierarchy that exists among them, while interesting in some contexts, does not provide 
a useful general understanding of how institutions and societies interact. This is why 
the circular flow of signals and information that forms the core of our model for smart 
institutions suggests a more dynamic and flexible superstructure, within which each ele-
ment is inextricably linked to others. In this, our view is perhaps closer to sociologists 
who emphasize the relevance of institutions to all aspects of social interaction (see, e.g., 
Portes 2006). Sociology also deals with institutions based on informal rules and norms, 
constructs that economics and positive political science are comparatively ill-equipped 
to deal with—issues such as the role of identity, traditions and culture, trust, religion and 
social classes. This is not an insignificant omission. Some economists concede that the 
relative role of informal institutions in comparison with their formal counterparts can-
not be disparaged. Williamson (2009) recently argues that informal institutions in fact 
strongly impact development and that, further, the success of formal institutions rests on 
codified informal constraints. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2010) suggest how countries with 
higher levels of trust require lower levels of regulation, arguing, therefore, that a link 
exists between formal institutional development and the level of trust. There is a need, 
therefore, for a broader interpretation of the role of institutions that extends beyond a 
piecemeal study of economic, social and political institutions; their interaction, in fact, is 
crucial to understanding the influence they have.
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In accordance with control theory, the steering institutions in our theory of smart 
institutions have an impact on outcomes that is partly deterministic, but, at the same 
time, also indirect. These features of determinacy and indirectness provide an under-
standing of the link between the signals generated by institutions and dynamic social 
processes, which is seldom the focus in the literature on institutional analysis. Consider, 
for example, how stated desires and suggestions, or even directives and commands, pro-
duced by a society’s institutions get translated into processes that affect real-world out-
comes. How precisely does an institution implement the various processes that control, 
or steer, social outcomes toward their desired levels? The signals sent from the control-
ler to the actuator are low powered and incapable of controlling a large physical plant, 
such as a signal sent first to change the angle on a wing flap to change the actual flight 
path of a large airship. As such, there is the need for actuators that can convert the low-
powered signal into one of higher power, such as by employing the use of driving motors 
on the wing in this example. Similarly, a steering institution may generate an actuating 
signal, such as a public announcement made by a church, a central bank or a political 
party, which must then be transformed by actuators such as believers, banks or activ-
ists into a signal of high enough power to have an impact on social processes. In other 
words, institutions trigger actuators, which then amplify the signals they receive to ena-
ble the outcomes produced by the plant. This need to convert low-powered signals to 
high-powered ones makes the effect of institutions, when examined directly, much more 
indirect and far less obvious than extant economic and political analyses would suggest.
There is basis in the literature for our view. For instance, Persson (2002) argues that 
there is a determinacy between the manner in which political institutions are established 
and the economic policies that they pursue. Glaeser et al. (2004) suggest that the effect 
that political institutions have on economic growth is muted if one considers the more 
dominant role that human capital plays in enabling growth directly. Indeed, Doucoulia-
gos and Ulubasoglu (2008), in a sweeping meta-analytic study conducted over 81 papers 
in the field, suggest that the effect of the political institutions associated with democracy 
(construed broadly) on economic growth appears to be patently indirect.
3.2  The output
In control process engineering theory, the output of a system under consideration can 
be as variegated as temperature, speed, effort, and so on. Engineers, therefore, are able 
to use the same underlying principles in a wide array of applications. The versatility 
of this approach makes it ideally suited as the basis for a theory of smart institutions, 
where the vast array of social contexts exceeds even the applications found in engineer-
ing. Depending on the context, then, the social scientist may wish to consider a micro-
cosm of economic activity and focus on the output produced in a single industry, or a 
take broader perspective and focus on growth of gross domestic product of an entire 
economy.
For our purpose of attempting to integrate the study of social, economic and politi-
cal institutions, in this section, we characterize the output as development in its 
broadest sense: an index capturing weighted growth in social, economic and political 
variables defined each period by social, economic and political institutions. Taking such 
a broad view allows us to elaborate on how steering institutions influence a society’s 
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development and how they respond to social feedback. In other words, it permits us to 
take an integrated view of institutional influence on society. While this is without doubt 
a complex exercise, control theory provides the very tools we require to handle this com-
plexity tractably.
Our starting point is the observation that development in a society, as defined above, 
cannot occur without the use of scarce resources. This economic principle of the scarcity 
of resources is the necessary condition that motivates choice, and holds equally true for 
most social and political variables as well. A social entity like a church is influenced in its 
decisions by the scarcity of resources it controls to the same extent as a profit maximiz-
ing firm even if its motivations and the nature of its output may be different. The local 
church may, for example, consider its output to be a vector comprising the promotion 
of religiosity, providing shelter and food to the homeless, and educating children. The 
extent to which this output grows over time (that is, the church develops) will always be 
constrained by the revenues it is able to collect, the assets it has in place, the availability 
of pastors, and so on. In the absence of regulation (e.g., laws over property rights and the 
enforcement of contracts) that controls the exploitation of scarce resources, the com-
petitive drive to exploit these limited resources would result in their rapid depletion and, 
consequently, lead to a growth path that is unsustainable. This market failure is the trag-
edy of the commons, and given the broad definition of development under consideration, 
it is an inevitable logical consequence of the under-regulation of society’s resources.
While the tragedy of commons sends a strong signal for the need for regulation, in 
general, there is no guarantee that regulation achieves greater success than its absence.4 
First, there exists the possibility of excessive regulation that leads to under-use of 
resources, which hampers development. This possibility, which is referred to as the trag-
edy of the anticommons, provides a strong incentive to limit the scope of regulation. Sec-
ond, there also exists the possibility of inefficient, or poorly implemented, regulation 
that fails to solve the market failure, or worse, even exacerbate it. Both these possibilities 
serve to highlight the strong prospect of regulatory failure as an impediment to 
development.5
To reiterate, the solution to the tragedy of the commons can result in the tragedy of 
the anticommons, and vice versa. There exists an elusive balance between the two, which 
reflects the balance between market failure and regulatory failure. The nature of interac-
tion between institutions, groups in society that provide feedback and those that par-
ticipate in the development process ultimately determines which tragedy manifests and 
to what extent. From the perspective of smart institutions, we can readily see that the 
steering institutions play a pivotal role in mitigating or in exacerbating a particular trag-
edy through the reference variables they begin with and the actuating signals they gener-
ate and that these signals respond dynamically to the development process. Institutions, 
in this view, not only determine the performance of the system in the short run (which 
seems to be much of what traditional economic theory focuses on), but also respond in 
the long run to feedback.
4 Indeed, this is an essential insight contained in Coase’s seminal paper on social cost (Coase 1960).
5 To see the interplay of this market and regulatory failure, consider the example provided by Mohan and Goorha (2008) 
in the context of the oil industry.
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Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) suggest that of the two broad types of institutions, as 
put forward by North—those protecting property rights and those that enable contracts 
by lowering transactions costs—it is the former that are more important for long-term 
growth since individuals adjust behavior to mitigate the problems posed by poor con-
tracting institutions. But, in our view, this is neither a necessary nor a useful distinction 
based as it is on the assumption that instrumental action by rational and forward-look-
ing agents mitigates the role of institutions, rather than explaining what role the institu-
tions play in that process. This should become clearer in our discussion on actuators and 
social feedback in the following sections.
3.3  The role of actuators and social feedback groups
The key difference between the actuator and the social feedback groups is in their role 
within the overall system of smart institutions. Social, political and economic actua-
tors operate within the plant and are verifiably allied to their respective institutions 
within the controller with the specific purpose of influencing the output. Social feed-
back groups, on the contrary, operate independently from the processes of the plant. The 
intricate manner in which actuators and social feedback groups operate in a society and 
the often subtle difference between the two is, we believe, one of the key reasons that 
make a unified theory of smart institutions in society much more fluid and complex than 
an engineered control system.
Tsebelis (1995) suggests that institutional or individual veto players in political systems 
are those whose consent is necessary in order to effect a change in the status quo. In a 
spatial voting setup, this is helpful in understanding how the size of the winset of the 
status quo legislative policy is affected by the number of veto players. However, as out-
lined in Sect. 2, an institution merely sends a ‘low-powered’ actuating signal; it is then 
the actuator’s ability, determined in conjunction with their development mechanism, to 
take ‘high-powered’ action based on this signal which grants the institution the power 
to stand as a veto player in the first place. This comes from the social actuators being 
verifiably, and perhaps even legally, allied to the institution. This gives us a useful defi-
nition of ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ institutions. An effective institution is one that enables 
a transformation of desired social objectives into outcomes. Our theory of smart insti-
tutions makes this precise by drawing attention to the process that an institution need 
employ to effect a desired outcome. The effort—which, in the very least, can be under-
stood as costs—that an institution would perforce expend in generating any outcome 
would depend on the capability of the social process it controls. This, in turn, would be 
determined by the ability of social actuators to comprehend and agree to the actions 
implied by the signals they receive from the institution and, thereafter, the efficacy of 
their development mechanisms in the production of the outcome.
Let ei measure the additional effort or cost incurred by a steering institution and ej 
measure the additional effort or cost incurred by an actuator. Similarly, let y measure 
a change in output. We can define a parameter θ = (�ej)/(�ei) that measures the addi-
tional effort incurred by actuators for a unit increase in signaling effort by the steering 
institutions and a parameter φ = �y/(�ej) that measures the additional output result-
ing from a unit increase in effort by an actuator. Intuitively, θ describes the effective-
ness of the steering institution (controller) in generating effort from the actuators, and 
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φ captures the effectiveness of the actuators in converting effort to output. The overall 
effectiveness of the process is, then, µ = θφ = �y/(�ei), which summarizes the change 
in end output of the process arising from a unit change in signaling effort by the steer-
ing institutions. For any given reference variable w (and assuming no exogenous distur-
bance, d), a higher µ corresponds to a greater ability of the steering institutions to alter 
output so that it aligns with the desired outcome of w, and therefore corresponds to a 
stronger institution.
In contrast to actuators, social feedback groups are not inextricably linked to the oper-
ations of the plant and the production of the output, which implies that they may not 
be relied upon to magnify a ‘low-powered signal’ generated by the steering institutions. 
They indirectly impact the manner in which the steering institutions set reference vari-
ables by a process of conveying subjective information to the steering institutions on the 
impact of development (output) on society.
Simple changes to a smart institutions model provide useful reference points to suit 
specific contexts. For example, if we were to weaken or sever the links to and from social 
feedback, we could examine a situation where there is little or no institutional devel-
opment. This could give us explanations for persistently poor institutions, repressive 
and highly redistributive institutions, and so on. By constructing a variant of the model 
where the link between the controller and the plant is weak, we could analyze a situation 
where institutional and civil society complexity does not translate to satisfactory social 
development outcomes.
The model laid out in Grossman and Helpman (1994) is useful in considering the dif-
ference between actuators and social feedback groups more explicitly. Each of the steer-
ing institutions can, in line with that paper, be seen to have a support function that draws 
its support from the strength of its actuators (and their development mechanisms) as 
well as the social feedback groups. The difference is that actuators are allied to their 
respective institutions, thus providing an externality on them upon the resolution of the 
common-agency game that arises from the steering institutions sending a signal to the 
plant. This perspective vividly suggests how the genres of institutions within the steer-
ing mechanism of institutions may have a synergistic relationship with one another as 
well as a confrontational one. It is also a helpful separation method for the classification 
of groups within a society, providing a useful link that seems missing in extant theoreti-
cal constructs—chiefly that of how institutions and all forms of social groups effect and 
are affected by social development outcomes (of which the development of markets and 
economic growth is but one).
The relationship between actuators and their development mechanisms within the 
social process (plant) of the smart institutions view is predominantly based on the galva-
nizing motivation of a shared benefit. As such the theory of clubs can be seen as a legiti-
mate basis to analyze their organization. The benefit of a good that a club provides 
imparts a joint benefit, which, rather generally, is a good with any degree of non-exclud-
ability or joint consumption characteristics, but the club good also features a concave 
marginal benefit curve by virtue of it becoming rivalrous upon reaching a congestion 
point. However, for a system of smart institutions, we can understand groups of actua-
tors and development mechanisms forming as the steering institutions enable produc-
tion of the club good that they derive utility from. Social institutions may provide 
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religion as a club good, political institutions may provide public goods or even political 
power as joint-benefit goods, and economic institutions may provide access to markets 
or common-pool resources as the club good.6
3.4  Actuators
While the prospect of a benefit allies the social actuators to the institutional control-
lers, there is still need to model their behavior. Recall that in control theory the actua-
tors magnify the signal they receive from the controller from low to high power when 
they transmit it to the mechanisms they affect. Likewise, in the smart institutions view, 
this is the role the social actuators must fulfill as well. Once they receive a signal from 
the steering institutions, social actuators must magnify them using the strength of their 
development mechanism (determined, in part, by their collective influence and organiz-
ing ability) in order to effect a change in the output in the direction desired by the steer-
ing institutions.
However, how is this signal magnified by the actuators? What gives the institutions 
the ability to conscript the actuators’ resources to convert its ‘low-powered’ signal into 
a higher-powered effort? Precisely who can qualify as an actuator? Can an individual be 
an actuator or must it be a collective entity? The answer lies in viewing the relationship 
between the actuator and the controller being that of a special case of an ‘incomplete 
contract’ between agents, with the output providing a joint-benefit club good.
The political rules (such as those embodied in a constitution), social customs and tra-
ditions, and the theoretical underpinnings of neoclassical economics upon which the 
steering institutions are based form an incomplete contract between the steering institu-
tions and the actuators. The contracts are incomplete in their inability to specify com-
prehensive state contingent provisions. This inability may arise from bounded rationality 
that results in unforeseen contingencies, or from excessive costs in negotiating detailed 
comprehensive contracts, or from costs associated with writing contracts that contain 
provisions that are comprehensible to, and verifiable by, a third party (like a court of law) 
that may have no knowledge of the environment within which the contracting parties 
operate (Grossman and Hart 1986).
Once an institution and an actuator enter a relationship, the contractual incomplete-
ness may have little consequence if the two can break the relationship with ease when 
an unspecified contingency is encountered and negotiations fail. What ties the actua-
tor and institutions together are relationship-specific investments: investments that are 
costly to make and have less value outside the relationship than they do inside (Klein 
et al. 1978; Grossman and Hart 1986; Williamson 1975). As an example, consider a steer-
ing institution like the executive, the social process comprising the cabinet of ministers 
as actuators and the bureaucracies of their respective ministries as the development 
mechanisms. Both the executive and the ministers must undertake a multitude of rela-
tionship-specific investments: the executive must understand the efficiency and caliber 
6 A fundamental advantage of characterizing such a good is that we can visualize the manner in which actuator and 
feedback groups function to the theoretical underpinnings of Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action. While the problem 
of free riding would naturally plague such a group, Olson suggested it is mitigated in cases where the benefit is provided 
only to active participants. He also suggested famously that the groups form to prevent the exploitation of the majority. 
These are useful distinctions: the former being apropos for actuator-development mechanism groups and the latter com-
ing in useful to describe the motivation of feedback groups.
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of the portfolio of its cabinet members, while the ministries must understand and imple-
ment government policies. Similarly, the governing body of a political party may under-
take investments in cultivating its candidates who, in turn, must undertake investments 
specific to the political party. It takes no stretch of imagination to realize that steering 
institutions and actuators in social, economic and political contexts make significant 
relationship-specific investments that cement their relationship.
To this static description, we must add the dynamic linkages that are integral to our 
theory of smart institutions. First, there occurs a process of social feedback that con-
stantly influences the steering institutions in its design of reference variables and actu-
ating signals. Second, in as much as the generation of the joint-benefit good (output) 
suffers from the tragedy of the commons or anticommons, institutions must perfect the 
balance between market and regulatory failure, which may require a reorganization of 
actuators and their development mechanisms within the plant.
3.5  Social feedback 
3.5.1  Information entropy theory 
Social feedback groups like the feedback mechanisms in control systems are knowledge 
processors. They receive and process information on the output given their understand-
ing of the reference variables and transmit this information back to the steering institu-
tions. This enables the steering institutions to adjust or reset the reference variables, if 
necessary, and design actuating signals that modify the path of output over time. How-
ever, in discussing feedback our primary goal is to underscore the quality of information 
in a system and, also, more generally, indicate what constitutes ‘information.’
The generation of social feedback can be understood to occur in the form of discrete 
random-variable signals constituted over a particular observation space. This feedback 
information is sent back to the controller. We imagine that these signals, given that 
they are generated by variegated and complex social processes, have varying degrees of 
uncertainty in their latent true meaning which must be deciphered by the controller.
In order to understand how institutions may process the meaning of these signals, we 
appeal to the theory of information entropy, which measures precisely this idea of corre-
lating the uncertainty surrounding an outcome to its inherent meaning. This concept is 
used frequently in computer science with respect to the treatment of stochastic events 
within an algorithmic framework.7
Entropy of a discrete random variable measures the unpredictability of an outcome 
and is defined by employing the idea of self-information, which, in turn, suggests how 
much information is actually revealed by an outcome. This is highly relevant to us in 
the social feedback mechanism because the strength of information revealed by a signal 
from the feedback is what inherently matters in a system of smart institutions. The infor-
mation contained in a signal depends on the probability of the signal zi being generated 
and is defined as:
7 We refer the interested reader to Jaynes (1957).
S(zi) = − log2 [P(zi)]
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This suggests that the information revealed from a signal that has a low probability of 
being generated is higher, which implies that a rare outcome has a high ‘surprisal’ value 
in the sense that it reveals more information than an expected outcome. The entropy, J, 
of the signal generating source is then defined as:
As an example, consider the one introduced in Sect.  2, of a government that tries to 
implement specific policies in its departments. To simplify matters, let us focus atten-
tion on a specific department, say the Department for the Environment and consider 
two reference variables: reducing carbon emissions by a particular amount and provid-
ing a certain percentage of energy requirements through renewable resources. While 
these objectives have their obvious environmental benefits, they also impose costs on 
society. The reduction of carbon emissions through a carbon tax, for example, may erode 
the profits of businesses (at least in the short term) and increase the prices of some 
goods for consumers. Similarly, the use of renewable resources may add to the rising 
costs of energy. Suppose, now, society expresses its subjective evaluation over the impact 
of the realized value of each reference variable (output) based on the statements—‘Very 
Happy: no change required,’ ‘Happy: minor modifications need to be made,’ ‘Satisfied: 
significant changes need to be made’ or ‘Unhappy: this policy needs to be trashed.’ This 
permits 16 possible outcomes for the evaluation of output by society. Suppose the signal 
sent through social feedback to the steering institution is very coarse and is limited to 
the set zt = {G,B}, where ‘G’ represents ‘good’ as the signal and ‘B’ represents ‘bad.’ The 
signal ‘G’ is sent when the evaluation does not involve ‘Unhappy’ for either reference 
variable, while the signal ‘B’ is sent when at least one reference variable receives an eval-
uation of ‘Unhappy.’ In this instance, 9 out of 16 outcomes will be transmitted with a sig-
nal of ‘G’ and 7 out of 16 outcomes transmitted with a signal of ‘B.’ Assuming that these 
outcomes are equally likely ex ante,8 before receiving the signal, the steering institution 
perceives probabilities P(B) = 716 and P(G) =
9
16. The information contained in signal of 
zt = B is then log2 167 , which exceeds the information contained in a signal of G (which 
equals log2 169 ), or the surprisal value of an appraisal of the outcomes as bad is higher to 
the steering institutions. Ex ante, prior to social feedback occurring, the entropy of the 
feedback is:
Now consider a finer partition of the outcomes in the signaling process, where a signal 
of ‘G’ is generated when the evaluation does not involve ‘Unhappy’ for either reference 
variable, the signal ‘B’ is sent when exactly one reference variable receives an evaluation 
of ‘Unhappy,’ and a signal of ‘E’ (‘Execrable’) is sent when both reference variables receive 








8 Though this assumption is unrealistic, it does simplify the intuition at work. It is, however, by no means necessary.
J (Z) = P(B) log2
1
P(B)
+ P(G) log 2
1
P(G)
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same assumptions as before) is P(B) = 616, P(G) =
9
16 and P(E) =
1
16. The information 
contained in zt = E is log2 16 = 4 and exceeds by far the information contained in the 
other signals. In this instance, the ‘surprisal’ value of zt = E is high and, as such, would 
be of comparatively significant value to the steering institutions.
Feedback in control systems happens as outcomes are systematically evaluated for 
their consonance with the reference variables before the controller is fed this informa-
tion to assist with its optimization dynamic. A surprisal event in this context is likely to 
be metered by the social groups as one that is rare or unpredictable in contrast to the 
reference variable, as will become clearer when we discuss the idea of tuning below. The 
crux though is that such feedback would hold more intrinsic information for the steering 
institutions.
3.5.2  Fuzzy feedback
In the real world, the measurement of social outcomes against targets (reference vari-
ables)—that themselves are rarely precise—causes a degree of ambiguity that, at first 
glance, seems entirely alien to the world of control theory and engineered systems.
How can a society possibly provide meaningful metering and feedback of outcomes to 
the controller when the references are imprecise to begin with, the efficacy of the actua-
tors may vary across the types of institutions and over time, the sources of disturbances 
in the system are variegated, and metering may be inconsistent and unreliable?
Thankfully this is a complication that control theory not only caters for but is getting 
increasingly adept at dealing with using the idea of fuzzy control. In fuzzy control, the 
process of automated control is deliberately based on using heuristic and experiential 
knowledge. Verbal feedback (whether gathered from larger samples using surveys and 
polls or gained from specific expert knowledge) can be translated into definitive and 
quantifiable values. What fuzzy control allows is to contextualize the system’s design 
using feedback that may appear to be imprecise or vague if it were to be seen as purely 
free of context.
For example, the interpretation of feedback received from a person of something 
being ‘very hot’ in the context of working in an aluminum smelting plant versus sitting 
in an office is naturally very different. Fuzzy control arrives at a more precise and useful 
underlying value for a controller’s input from such feedback by allowing the descriptions 
to fall into fuzzy sets that can handle increasing degrees of membership rather than sim-
ple dichotomous classifications.
With our setup to institutional analysis, though, fuzzy control is simplified by the fact 
that social feedback will usually belong to only one of the three sets of steering institu-
tions. Suppose social feedback consists of set of elements z ∈ Z. Let S, P and E represent 
the set of social, political and economic feedback, respectively. A fuzzy set of social feed-
back Z has associated membership functions µj : Z → [0, 1], ∀j ∈ {S,P,E} that assigns 
every element z ∈ Z a degree of membership, µj(z), to social, economic and political 
interpretations of that feedback. Consider, for instance, our example of the reference 
variables initiated by Department for the Environment developed earlier (in Sect. 3.4). 
The idea of entropy emphasized the amount of information contained by a signal, say 
z = G. If S(z) = log2 169 , for example, the information contained by that signal is .83 
‘bits’; in essence, with 16 possible outcomes in this example, the uncertainty is reduced 
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from 4 to 3.17 bits. To continue with the same example, one could pose the question 
whether this signal z = G suggests a ‘good’ evaluation of the political decision making 
process (that is, in this context, the political steering institution), the acceptable eco-
nomic consequences of these policies (of more relevance to economic steering institu-
tions), or a favorable social impact through the move toward a cleaner environment (that 
social steering institutions would benefit from learning), or indeed, some mix of the 
three. If the feedback were ‘crisp,’ then one would have to assign the signal membership 
to only one of the three sets S, P or E; a fuzzy feedback, however, allows membership of 
varying degrees to all three. This perspective disallows any clear separation of feedback 
into purely economic, social or political domains, which is as it should be when adopting 
an eclectic view to institutional analysis.
Moreover, and importantly, fuzzy control allows a quantifiable interpretation of qual-
itative feedback, such as z = G. In our context, this quantifiable interpretation relates 
to the ability of social feedback to reflect society’s view on what the reference variables 
should be, which we denote wˆt, and, thereby, provides the steering institutions guidance 
on whether or how the input signal should be amended. In our example, social feedback 
of z = G is likely to be interpreted by the steering institutions as wˆt that is closer to wt 
than a feedback of z = B. In the next section, we investigate further how an institution 
might respond to social feedback in its signal to the actuators.
The idea of second-best institutions in Rodrik (2008) noted above is useful for draw-
ing attention to the value of context sensitivity. The idea of fuzzy control as the basis of 
smart institutions forms a useful link between the first-best ideal and the second-best 
reality. Ideal institutions are based on the known or crisp sets within the universe of dis-
course, whereas the second-best are based on their fuzzy set counterparts and tend to be 
heavily based on the particular context of a given society.
4  Tuning for smart control
We now turn to the question of the methodology for how we might examine the exer-
tion of control by the steering institutions in a system of smart institutions. In order to 
understand how the steering institutions incorporate social feedback in controlling the 
system, we introduce a critical part of the control process engineering setup—that of the 
tuning. In that regard, we take inspiration from proportional–integral–derivative (PID) 
tuning. PID tuning clearly suggests how a complex process or behavior, involving move-
ment to and from a theoretical ideal or setpoint, may be manipulated and controlled. 
The overall tuning methodology is comprised of three components; in our context, the 
PID methodology serves to characterize how the steering institutions produce their sig-
nal to the social actuators.
To understand the manner in which PID tuning is used in engineering systems, con-
sider a simple example. Suppose a thermostat is used as a controller to maintain the 
temperature in a room at a desired level (the reference variable or setpoint). The actual 
temperature at some point in time (output or process variable) may vary from the 
desired level; the divergence between the setpoint and process variable gives rise to an 
error. Sensors that monitor this error provide feedback to the controller, which must 
then generate an output in the form of an actuating signal to the air-conditioning unit, 
or the plant, to change the temperature in a desired direction. Intuitively, a proportional 
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adjustment focuses attention on generating a signal that is proportional only to the cur-
rent error without reference to accuracy in steady state. An integral adjustment process, 
by comparison, is much more sophisticated in that it adds past errors to the adjustment 
process and is, therefore, likely to achieve steady-state accuracy since the controller will 
always output an actuating signal as long as any error remains. Relying on integral action 
alone is, however, not ideal in the face of a large sudden error, and the actuating signal 
response would only become sufficient once the error has been allowed enough time to 
integrate. Finally, the derivative component reflects the rate of change of the error over 
time and is thus sensitive not just to a given error but to incipient changes in errors. 
These components can be combined to form a variety of algorithms for designing the 
controller’s action such as P, PI, PD or PID control.
4.1  PID tuning for smart institutions 
In moving from physical processes to social, economic and political processes, the 
increase in complexity, especially in the nature and implications of feedback, is not insig-
nificant. In most engineering applications, for example, the role of feedback is ancillary, 
even to the extent that the control algorithm of the system can be illustrated by dropping 
the metering element’s role altogether. This is because the physical laws affecting the sys-
tem are far better understood. In a theory of smart institutions, on the contrary, the role 
of feedback is intrinsic and has implications on both the approach of the controller (the 
control algorithm) as well as the outcomes it generates over time. In many instances, 
the steering institutions may be influenced by the feedback to change the reference vari-
ables themselves rather than simply adjust the control action that they take in achieving 
a given reference variable.
In a smart institutions setup, the steering institutions output a signal measured on 
some numeric scale from the lower bound representing no adjustment to the upper 
bound representing maximum adjustment. Its function is to motivate the actions of 
the social actuators within the social process. Adjusting the signal level determines the 
desired rate of adjustment. A higher level corresponds to a desired goal of faster adjust-
ment. We imagine that the steering institutions use PID control in this manner, which 
provides a methodical approach to incorporating the idea of how societies with vary-
ing levels of information would go about manipulating the behavior of their desired out-
comes and what factors may come to affect this.
In this section, we attempt to modify the PID tuning methodology for the context of a 
smart institutions theory. In doing so, we focus on a discrete time version of the tuning 
process which provides greater intuition than a continuous time description. A move 
from the discrete to its continuous counterpart is, however, relatively straightforward.
Suppose that at time t the reference variable set by the steering institutions is wt, 
which, via the control process, yields an output of yt. Social feedback generates a feed-
back signal, zt, which is naturally a function of the control error, but as described in 
Sect.  3.5, the social feedback also indicates the reference variables desired by society, 
denoted wˆt. This is a departure from most control process engineering systems where 
metering does not involve feedback on the setpoint targets, and is what makes our the-
ory of smart institutions a more complex and interesting application. Now consider the 
situation at the end of period t. The divergence between the reference variables set by the 
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steering institutions and those desired by society is wˆt − wt. In period t + 1, the steering 
institutions must determine how much change to bring about to the reference variables 
from the previous period, wt, based on feedback. The reference variables in period t + 1 
are, then:
Here, σ ∈ [0, 1] measures the sensitivity of the steering institutions to the divergence 
between its reference targets and those suggested by social feedback. The term γt is a 
shock parameter that captures any external influence on the setting of the reference vari-
ables by steering institutions. A steering institution that is entirely insensitive to social 
feedback is captured by σ = 0, while σ = 1, corresponds to a situation where the steer-
ing institution’s response is driven entirely by social feedback. One could consider a situ-
ation where the steering institutions are given a different set of reference variables by 
social feedback in the next period. In a situation where wˆ �= wt , the steering institutions 
may interpret this feedback in two ways. On the one hand, they may believe that society 
conceives of them as being incapable of reducing the control error sufficiently using the 
previously defined references. In such a case, a steering institution may well set σ to a low 
level and attempt to concentrate efforts on adjusting its signal to the plant. On the other 
hand, the steering institutions may receive the feedback on reference variable on face 
value and agree to them as the new set of reference variables. For example, a politician 
that has taken a hawkish policy measure may receive negative feedback from society, 
which may include, both, an assessment of how the hawkish policy has not created the 
expected output as well as a recommendation to adopt a new policy that is more dovish. 
The steering institution may either choose to ignore the feedback on policy adjustment 
altogether and pursue the hawkish policy till the expected outcome is achieved or it may, 
instead, abandon the hawkish policy altogether in favor of the dovish version as sug-
gested by society. We can also imagine a dictatorship that is impervious to social feed-
back as being modeled with σ = 0, while a more democratic political regime as having σ 
lie somewhere in the interval [0, 1]. Similarly, a central bank that has a mandate to target 
inflation, say always to lie below 3 %, will retain this reference variable no matter what 
the social feedback is on the outcome or the reference, and like the dictator above, can 
be modeled with σ = 0. On the other hand, a government that attempts to implement a 
new policy to reduce carbon emissions by a certain percentage by introducing a carbon 
tax may be very sensitive to the social feedback on its policy; in this instance, we would 
expect σ to lie close to 1.
The expression for wt+1 as stated above captures the general way in which the refer-
ence variables set by steering institutions adapt over time in response to social feedback. 
The expression can be altered, however, depending on the context and problem at hand. 
For example, consider the following variant, assuming that σ �= 0:
This formulation suggests that the steering institution is amenable to changing the ref-
erence variable in response to social feedback only if the magnitude of wˆt − wt passes a 









+ γt if |wˆt − wt | ≥ w¯
wt+1 = wt + γt if |wˆt − wt | ≺ w¯
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critical level. Assuming γ = 0, this allows for the reference variable to remain unchanged 
till t + j, when the divergence of the reference variable from that desired by society 
exceeds the critical level. For example, as suggested by Williamson (2000; see Sect. 3.1), 
some institutions (such as social institutions) are slower to change than others. Setting a 
higher critical level helps capture this feature.
Given wt+1, the steering institutions would have to send an actuating signal that ena-
bles a change in the output realized in time t, yt, to the output it desires in period t + 1, 
wt+1. The ‘error’ is then the difference between the two; in other words:
The error term captures the change in output that the steering institutions desire to con-
trol for in the following period through a change in their signal level to the social actua-
tors. It will be recalled from Sect. 2 that the steering institutions can control the output 
only through a low-powered actuating signal, with the social mechanism effecting the 
actual change in output. The actuating signal required to bring about the change et+1 is 
in the first instance proportional to et+1, so that a greater change requires a higher signal. 
For example, if a central bank desires a large decrease in inflation, it must signal this with 
a greater increase in the interest rate (the actuating signal). The specific proportional 
link between the desired change in output and the actuating signal can be described as:
The constant of proportionality P is referred to as the proportional gain in control theory. 
In our context, we can interpret P as the sensitivity of the steering institutions’ response 
to a given error. Consequently, the higher the value of P, the greater the response of the 
steering institutions to a given error, and therefore the greater the stimulus to the plant 
to effect a change in output. As can be imagined, a P that is too high will result in an 
unstable system where the output produced by the plant overshoots the desired mark 
due to excessive stimulus from the steering institutions.
In an engineering system, the proportional tuning carries the bulk of the tuning 
adjustments by a controller. However, since it only corrects the immediate error in the 
system, it is quite possible that even in a steady state an error persists. Persistent error of 
this sort is corrected by adjusting the tuning for past error, which is the purpose of the 
integral component of the tuning process. In our context, this corresponds to a situa-
tion where steering institutions have a memory for past errors, and use that memory to 
reduce persistent errors. Specifically, this adds a term to the actuating signal:
Here, the constant I is the integral gain, and has a similar interpretation to P. While inte-
gral control allows a memory for past errors, if the gain is too high, it can result in an 
output that oscillates about the reference and, and the longer the memory for errors is 
factored into the tuning process, the more likely this is to occur.
In situations where the reference variables change often, and in large magnitude, as 
can often occur in a social, economic or political situation, proportional and integral 
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tuning may generate responses that are too slow or subject to overshooting targets. To 
facilitate a quicker and smoother response, a derivative component can be added to the 
tuning process, where the current error is compared to the previous one. A rapid change 
in the error can thus be compensated for by the steering institution while generating an 
actuating signal. Particularly, derivative tuning can be viewed as a linear extrapolation of 
past errors. The derivative term can be summarized as:
The overall actuating signal generated by the steering institution is then the sum of the 
three components:
Depending on the level of information gathered by the steering institution and the spe-
cific context under analysis, we expect that a steering institution would use some combi-
nation of the three components, say PI or P only or PID, to tune the output.
5  Concluding remarks
The behavior of institutions has received extensive analysis from the different disciplines 
of the social sciences. Much of this literature tends to be retrospective, often analyz-
ing the historical relevance of institutions to societies, the nature of their influence over 
societies and even their very historicity. Our motivation for the idea of smart institutions 
expressed in this paper was a desire to construct a forward-looking methodology for 
institutional analysis that enables the consideration of institutions as social constructs 
transcending any of the social sciences in isolation, and yet can be understood using for-
mal and tractable constructs.
Institutions evolve, but they often also need to be designed with an eye on their rel-
evance to the context within which they exist. To assist in this ambition, we present a 
theory for smart institutions, inspired by control process engineering, that is capable of 
handing many of the features that are central to the characterization of real-world insti-
tutions. Inherent in this characterization is an element of dynamism, where institutions 
are affected by social feedback on change they help foster. Institutions can receive infor-
mation from a wide variety of sources and of varying degrees of quality ranging from 
crisp quantitative data to fuzzy qualitative feedback. The ability to incorporate all these 
types of information in a single analytical framework and to provide some understanding 
of what constitutes useful information for institutions is, we believe, one of the primary 
strengths of the smart institutions theory. Given the complexity of this exercise, we have 
drawn a fine balance between analytical rigor that forms the backbone of control process 
engineering and the intuition that is necessary to understand social science phenomena.
Our goal in this paper has been to lay the skeleton for an analytic interdisciplinary 
approach to institutional analysis. Certainly, this skeleton has to be fleshed out depend-
ing on the context of analysis. However, in this endeavor we have the benefit of a vast 
array of tools that control process engineers have developed to handle context-based 
modifications to the fundamental structure. While potential applications are as vast as 
the variety of social science contexts that exist, we conclude with three areas that form 
the basis of our current research applying the smart institutions methodology.
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First, explicit modeling of the frequency with which  the steering institutions adjust 
their actuating signals can be used to study inertia in institutional change, the cyclical 
patterns of such change and how they correspond to cyclical changes in output. To con-
textualize this even further with empirics, we could enquire how institutional change is 
linked to business cycles and how this varies across countries. Second, we view the bal-
ance between market and regulatory failure as effects of institutional output, and explore 
the idea of this balance being devised as the reference variable by steering institutions in 
a particular society. Third, we empirically investigate the use of fuzzy feedback by insti-
tutions. Overall, we hope that advances in control process engineering will benefit those 
of us who are fascinated by how institutions function.
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